The Cold War Bipolarity Structure And The Power Vacuum In

Abstract: The end of the Cold War produced a significant shift in the structure of the international system. It also witnessed an increased use of peacekeeping as a mechanism to deal with conflicts. This increase is often attributed to a supposed "changing nature of conflict," where intra-state war has become more common than the classic inter-state war and conflict has become more violent, brutal, and complicated. However, these descriptions leave important aspects of peacekeeping operations unexplained. A better explanation is needed for the international community's increased intervention in conflicts. This thesis argues that the bipolar international structure of the Cold War placed restrictions on the way United Nations peacekeeping was created and performed. The end of the Cold War and the consequent changes in the international structure explain the shift in peacekeeping that occurred in the 1990s. As the structure of the international system has continued to evolve in the 21st Century, peacekeeping has also shifted. The institution of peacekeeping, itself a response to conflict by the international system, has become what it is because of the changes in the structure of the international system. Any future shift to a bipolar or multipolar structure will again affect the way peacekeeping functions.

The end of the Cold War and subsequent dissolution of the Soviet Union resulted in a new unipolar international system that presented fresh challenges to international relations theory. Since the Enlightenment, scholars have speculated that patterns of cooperation and conflict might be systematically related to the manner in which power is distributed among states. Most of what we know about this relationship, however, is based on European experiences between the seventeenth and twentieth centuries, when five or more powerful states dominated international relations, and the latter twentieth century, when two superpowers did so. Building on a highly successful special issue of the leading journal World Politics, this book seeks to determine whether what we think we know about power and patterns of state behaviour applies to the current 'unipolar' setting and, if not, how core theoretical propositions about interstate interactions need to be revised.

Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the previously well-established organisation of world politics has been thrown into disarray. While during the Cold War, the bipolarity of the world gave other powers a defined structure within which to vie for power, influence and material wealth, the current global political landscape has been transformed by a diffusion of power. As a result, the world has seen the rise of sub-national or quasi-/non-state actors, such as Hezbollah, al-Qaeda and the movement that calls itself Islamic State, or ISIS. These dramatic geopolitical shifts have heavily impacted state-society relationships, power and authority in the international system. Weak
States, Strong Societies analyses the effect of these developments on the new world order, arguing that the framework of ‘weak state, strong society’ appears even more applicable to the contemporary global landscape than it did during the Cold War. Focusing on a range of regional contexts, the book explores what constitutes a weak or strong state. It will be essential reading for specialists in politics and international relations, whether students or academic researchers. This book provides new and exceptional interpretations in regard to the post-World War 2 history of the East-West conflict and calls for interdisciplinary approaches in analyzing international relations. The systematic and political processes are undoing the division of Europe and restoring an ‘organically' interdependent continent. The events of 1989 in Eastern Europe are but a harbinger of a new security order in Europe and, for the first time since the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 Europe tries to look beyond state-centered concepts of security.

This innovative argument shows the consequences of increased aversion to international war for foreign and military policy.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the international system has been unipolar, centered on the United States. But the rise of China foreshadows a change in the distribution of power. Øystein Tunsjø shows that the international system is moving toward a U.S.-China standoff, bringing us back to bipolarity—a system in which no third power can challenge the top two. The Return of Bipolarity in World Politics surveys the new era of superpowers to argue that the combined effects of the narrowing power gap between China and the United States and the widening power gap between China and any third-ranking power portend a new bipolar system that will differ in crucial ways from that of the last century. Tunsjø expands Kenneth N. Waltz’s structural-realism theory to examine the new bipolarity within the context of geopolitics, which he calls “geostructural realism.” He considers how a new bipolar system will affect balancing and stability in U.S.-China relations, predicting that the new bipolarity will not be as prone to arms races as the previous era’s; that the risk of limited war between the two superpowers is likely to be higher in the coming bipolarity, especially since the two powers are primarily rivals at sea rather than on land; and that the superpowers are likely to be preoccupied with rivalry and conflict in East Asia instead of globally. Tunsjø presents a major challenge to how international relations understands superpowers in the twenty-first century.

1. The realist tradition

The Cold War was the longest conflict in a century defined by the scale and brutality of its conflicts. In the battle between the democratic West and the communist East there was barely a year in which the West was not organising, fighting or financing some foreign war. It was an engagement that resulted – in Korea, Guatemala, Nicaragua and elsewhere – in some twenty million dead. This collection of essays analyses the literary response to the coups, insurrections and invasions that took place around the globe, and explores the various thematic and stylistic trends that Cold War hostilities engendered in world writing. Drawing together scholars of various cultural backgrounds, the volume focuses upon such themes as
representation, nationalism, political resistance, globalisation and ideological scepticism. Eschewing the typical focus in Cold War scholarship on Western authors and genres, there is an emphasis on the literary voices that emerged from what are often considered the ‘peripheral’ regions of Cold War geo-politics. Ranging in focus from American postmodernism to Vietnamese poetry, from Cuban autobiography to Maoist theatre, and from African fiction to Soviet propaganda, this book will be of real interest to all those working in twentieth-century literary studies, cultural studies, history and politics.

Since the 1950s, Japan-Europe relations have been characterised by a mutual coldness in terms of diplomatic dialogue, punctuated by a number of trade disputes. This book analyses the development of the political and diplomatic relationship between Japan and Europe, and shows that – especially during the Cold War years – whilst they share a wide range of political values and goals, the quality of diplomatic relations has often been sacrificed to both overcome trade issues and as a result of systemic factors. Focusing on the institutionalization of relations between Japan and the EU, this book examines both the historical-diplomatic dimension and political-strategic discourse. It traces the historical development of the relationship from the post-war years, to the signing of the Japan-EU action plan in 2001, which marked a key turning point in the relationship. It goes on to examine the achievements and criticisms of ASEM, the Asia-Europe Meeting, which whilst meeting successfully for the past sixteen years, has also been condemned as little more than a talking shop. Crucially, Oliviero Frattolillo’s analysis clearly demonstrates how the interaction between Japan and the EU has been constructed on the basis of their perceptions of each other, thus underlining the inherent impact of different political identities, cultures and values on international relations. Providing a keen insight into Japan-EU relations, this book will appeal to students and scholars of Japanese and European history and politics, as well as those interested in the history of international relations and security studies.

Few studies of Middle East wars go beyond a narrative of events and most tend to impose on this subject the rigid scheme of superpower competition. The Gulf War of 1991, however, challenges this view of the Middle East as an extension of the global conflict. The failure of the accord of both superpowers to avoid war even once regional superpower competition in the Middle East had ceased must give rise to the question: Do regional conflicts have their own dynamic? Working from this assumption, the book examines local-regional constraints of Middle East conflict and how, through escalation and the involvement of extra-regional powers, such conflicts acquire an international dimension. The theory of a regional subsystem is employed as a framework for conceptualising this interplay between regional and international factors in Tibi’s examination of the Middle East wars in the period 1967-91. Tibi also provides an outlook into the future of conflict in the Middle East in the aftermath of the most recent Gulf War.

This controversial set of essays evaluates and extends international relations theory in light of the revolutionary events of past years. The contributors demonstrate how theoretical constructs did not anticipate Soviet foreign policies that led to the end of the Cold War. At the conclusion of World War II, Asia was hardly more than a geographic expression. Yet today we recognize Asia as a vibrant and assertive region, fully transformed from the vulnerable nation-states that emerged following the Second World War. The transformation was by no means an inevitable one, but the product of two key themes that have dominated Asia’s international relations since 1945: the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union to enlist the region’s states as assets in the Cold War, and the struggle of nationalistic Asian leaders to develop the domestic support to maintain power and independence in a dangerous international context. Becoming Asia provides a comprehensive, systemic account of how these themes played out in Asian affairs during the postwar years, covering not only East Asia, but South and Central Asia as well. In addition to exploring the
interplay between nationalism and Cold War bipolarity during the first postwar decades, authors Alice Lyman Miller and Richard Wich chart the rise of largely export-led economies that are increasingly making the region the global center of gravity, and document efforts in the ongoing search for regional integration. The book also traces the origins and evolution of deep-rooted issues that remain high on the international agenda, such as the Taiwan question, the division of Korea and the threat of nuclear proliferation, the Kashmir issue, and the nuclearized Indian-Pakistani conflict, and offers an account of the rise of China and its implications for regional and global security and prosperity. Primary documents excerpted throughout the text—such as leaders' talks and speeches, international agreements, secret policy assessments—enrich accounts of events, offering readers insight into policymakers' assumptions and perceptions at the time.

Published in 1999. These essays are not deconstructive in the postmodern sense. None of the authors have that depth of scepticism about knowledge claims, but they are all concerned that the terms of reference of Cold War enquiry have been inappropriately bounded. The chapters by Murray and Reynolds specifically address the broad theoretical issues involved with paradigms and explanation. The chapters by Dobson, Marsh, Malik, Evans and Dix stretch out Cold War paradigms with successive case studies of Anglo-American relations; the USA, Britain, Iran and the oil majors; the Gulf States and the Cold War; South Africa and the Cold War; and Indian neutralism. All five authors challenge the efficacy of neo-realism analysis and explanation and critique the way that assumptions derived from that position have been used in historical explanation. The chapters by Ryall, Rogers and Bideleux deal with Roman Catholicism in East Central Europe, with nuclear matters and with the Soviet perspective. Each work goes beyond the limits of Cold War paradigms. Finally, Ponting places the Cold War in the broad context of world history. These essays provide thought-provoking scholarship which helps us both to nuance our understanding of the Cold War and to realise that it should not be taken as an all-embracing paradigm for the explanation of postwar international relations.

The definitive history of the Cold War and its impact around the world We tend to think of the Cold War as a bounded conflict: a clash of two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, born out of the ashes of World War II and coming to a dramatic end with the collapse of the Soviet Union. But in this major new work, Bancroft Prize-winning scholar Odd Arne Westad argues that the Cold War must be understood as a global ideological confrontation, with early roots in the Industrial Revolution and ongoing repercussions around the world. In The Cold War, Westad offers a new perspective on a century when great power rivalry and ideological battle transformed every corner of our globe. From Soweto to Hollywood, Hanoi, and Hamburg, young men and women felt they were fighting for the future of the world. The Cold War may have begun on the perimeters of Europe, but it had its deepest reverberations in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, where nearly every community had to choose sides. And these choices continue to define economies and regimes across the world. Today, many regions are plagued with environmental threats, social divides, and ethnic conflicts that stem from this era. Its ideologies influence China, Russia, and the United States; Iraq and Afghanistan have been destroyed by the faith in purely military solutions that emerged from the Cold War. Stunning in its breadth and revelatory in its perspective, this book expands our understanding of the Cold War both geographically and chronologically, and offers an engaging new history of how today's world was created.

James McAllister outlines a new account of early Cold War history, one that focuses on the emergence of a bipolar structure of power, the continuing importance of the German question, and American efforts to create a united Western Europe. Challenging the conventional wisdom among both international relations theorists and Cold War historians, McAllister argues that America's central objective from the Second World
War to the mid-1950s was to create a European order that could be peaceful and stable without requiring the permanent presence of American ground forces on the continent. The permanent presence of American forces in Europe is often seen as a lesson that policymakers drew from the disastrous experiences of two world wars, but McAllister's archival research reveals that both FDR and Eisenhower, as well as influential strategists such as George Kennan, did not draw this lesson. In the short term, American power was necessary to balance the Soviet Union and reassure Western Europe about the revival of German power, but America's long-term objective was to create the conditions under which Western Europe could take care of both of these problems on their own. In the author's view, the key element of this strategy was the creation of the European Defense Community. If Western Germany could be successfully integrated and rearmed within the context of the EDC, Western Europe would have taken the most important step to becoming a superpower on par with the United States and the Soviet Union. Understanding why this strategy was pursued and why it failed, McAllister asserts, has important implications for both international relations theory and contemporary questions of American foreign policy.
students' data analysis

East Asia's rapidly changing role in international security, the global economy, development and global governance are expertly accounted for in this much-needed, state-of-the-art text. Xiaoming Huang offers an engaging and informed account of the key concepts, issues and actors working in this area. Ranging from the region's history, to culture and a comparative assessment of the region's states, this text is informed throughout by a compelling theoretical framework. In so doing, it unpicks the often complex relationships both at the domestic level and externally. Only with this understanding is it possible to make sense of the region's complex relationships both internally and externally. Structured around key concepts in international relations of war and peace, economic development and increased contemporary security threats, this text offers an empirically-rich, engaging account of the changing fortunes of East Asia.

Presents a challenge to international relations scholars to think globally, understanding the field's development in the Global South alongside the traditionally dominant Western approach.

Analyzes the geopolitical situation of post-Cold War Afghanistan; its interior ethnic, religious, social, and geographical differences; the effects of the Afghan war; and the changes that the Taliban have wrought on the nation.

Soviet efforts to end the Cold War were intended to help revitalize the USSR. Instead, Nick Bisley argues, they contributed crucially to its collapse. Using historical-sociological theory, The End of the Cold War and the Causes of Soviet Collapse shows that international confrontation had been an important element of Soviet rule and that the retreat from this confrontational posture weakened institutional-functional aspects of the state. This played a vital role in making the USSR vulnerable to the forces of economic crisis, elite fragmentation and nationalism which ultimately caused its collapse.

A path-breaking collection of essays by cutting-edge authors that reassess the Cold War since the fall of communism.

This book examines the contention that current US-Russia relations have descended into a 'New Cold War'. It examines four key dimensions of the original Cold War, the structural, the ideological, the psychological, and the technological, and argues that the current US-Russia relationship bears little resemblance to the Cold War. Presently, the international system is transitioning towards multipolarity, with Russia a declining power, while current ideological differences and threat perceptions are neither as rigid nor as bleak as they once were. Ultimately, when the four dimensions of analysis are weighed in unison, this work argues that the claim of a New Cold War is a hyperbolic assessment of US-Russia relations.

A lively and accessible new introduction to the origins and emergence of the Cold War. Caroline Kennedy-Pipe brings to life the clashes of ideas and personalities that led Russia and America into decades of conflict and draws out important lessons for policy and analysis in today's equally formative period in world affairs.

This is the first book to examine in detail the relationship between the Cold War and International Law.

This title was first published in 2000: An in-depth look at the definition of power. The writing is well crafted and very readable and comprises a range of theoretical
deliberations and analysis of the numerous aspects of political power and its use in international relations. This includes an examination of idea and structure: population; territory; economics; military; the political system; ideology; and morale and its forms appearing in international relations in the past, present and future: influence and force. This, coupled with the author’s gift for teasing out the pertinent points in an argument and using relevant and interesting examples, provides an excellent piece of comprehensive insight into a theory of political power.

This volume examines the origins and early years of the Cold War in the first comprehensive historical reexamination of the period. A team of leading scholars shows how the conflict evolved from the geopolitical, ideological, economic and sociopolitical environments of the two world wars and interwar period.

The Return of Bipolarity in World PoliticsChina, the United States, and Geostructural RealismColumbia University Press

Primarily intended as a supplemental text for students of international politics or world history, but possibly of interest to general readers as well. Relies on secondary sources, memoirs, journals, and collections of documents. Covers the world at the end of the war, the bipolar structure of the 1950s and 1960s, the rise of global politics, the end of the Cold War, and events outside of the major powers. Published in 1966 and 1975 by Wiley. Paper edition (unseen), $24.95. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

After World War II, the escalating tensions of the Cold War shaped the international system. Fearing the Worst explains how the Korean War fundamentally changed postwar competition between the United States and the Soviet Union into a militarized confrontation that would last decades. Samuel F. Wells Jr. examines how military and political events interacted to escalate the conflict. Decisions made by the Truman administration in the first six months of the Korean War drove both superpowers to intensify their defense buildup. American leaders feared the worst-case scenario—that Stalin was prepared to start World War III—and raced to build up strategic arms, resulting in a struggle they did not seek out or intend. Their decisions stemmed from incomplete interpretations of Soviet and Chinese goals, especially the belief that China was a Kremlin puppet. Yet Stalin, Mao, and Kim Il-sung all had their own agendas, about which the United States lacked reliable intelligence. Drawing on newly available documents and memoirs—including previously restricted archives in Russia, China, and North Korea—Wells analyzes the key decision points that changed the course of the war. He also provides vivid profiles of the central actors as well as important but lesser known figures. Bringing together studies of military policy and diplomacy with the roles of technology, intelligence, and domestic politics in each of the principal nations, Fearing the Worst offers a new account of the Korean War and its lasting legacy.

Landlocked Countries Foreign Policy and Cross Border Security.

In this conceptually bold project, Heonik Kwon uses anthropology to interrogate the cold war's cultural and historical narratives. Adopting a truly panoramic view of local politics and international events, he challenges the notion that the cold war was a global struggle fought uniformly around the world and that the end of the war marked a radical, universal rupture in modern history. Incorporating comparative ethnographic study into a thorough analysis of the period, Kwon upends cherished ideas about the global and their hold on contemporary social science. His narrative describes the slow decomposition of a complex social and political order involving a number of local and culturally creative processes. While the nations of Europe and North America experienced the cold war as a time of "long peace," postcolonial nations entered a different reality altogether, characterized by vicious civil wars and other exceptional forms of violence. Arguing that these events should be integrated into any account of the era, Kwon captures the first sociocultural portrait of the cold war in all its subtlety and diversity.

From 1960s to the early 1970s in East Asia, the Cold War bipolar system, centering on the US and USSR, shifted to a more complicated structure. After the Cuban Missile Crisis, Washington and Moscow accelerated the détente process, leading China to fear a "collusion" of the two superpowers. Publicly attacking its former ally while continuing to fight against America, China rose as a symbol of multipolarization in international politics during this era. Focusing on Japan’s policy toward this changing paradigm, Kanda examines Japanese leaders’ perceptions of the international order and how they reacted to this changing international environment. This book moves beyond the traditional Euro-centric view of the Cold War, emphasizing the significant role Japan played. The research provides insight into the foreign policy patterns of post-World War Two Japanese diplomacy, particularly in relation to China and the USSR. The investigation relies on careful readings of archival records from Japan, China, Taiwan, the US, the UK, Australia and the UN, published diplomatic documents from France and Germany, and personal papers, diaries and memoirs. This volume will appeal to anyone who is interested in postwar Japan's politics and diplomacy, international history of East Asia, and the Cold War history in general.

More than a decade after victory in Cold War, the U.S. continues to grapple with how best to structure its strategic nuclear forces and to reorient its deterrence policy in the post Cold War era. A complex multi-polar international structure replaced a much simpler bipolar structure that was dominated by a well-understood monolithic threat. The resultant uncertainty drives the U.S. to adjust its deterrence strategy to the changed strategic environment. The Bush Administration proposed a new strategic plan with significant adjustments to force structure and deterrence policy. I propose to assess the Bush Administration's plan for strategic nuclear deterrence in the Third Millennium. I will first examine the concept of deterrence strategy and then review the strategies used in the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. I will then assess the existing and emerging strategic threats. I will then review the emerging strategy of the Bush Administration and provide alternative strategies in comparison to the Bush Plan for U.S. strategic nuclear deterrence.

This electronic version has been made available under a Creative Commons (BY-NC-ND) open access license. For over five decades, the Cold War security agenda was
distinguished by the principal strategic balance, that of a structure of bipolarity, between the United States (US) and the Soviet Union (USSR). This book seeks to draw from current developments in critical security studies in order to establish a new framework of inquiry for security in the Middle East. It addresses the need to redefine security in the Middle East. The focus is squarely on the Arab-Israeli context in general, and the Palestinian-Israeli context in particular. The character of Arab-Israeli relations are measured by the Israeli foreign policy debate from the 1950s to the 1990s. A dialogue between Islam and Islamism as a means to broaden the terrain on which conflict resolution and post-bipolar security in the Middle East is to be understood is presented. The Middle East peace process (MEPP) was an additional factor in problematizing the military-strategic concept of security in the Middle East. The shift in analysis from national security to human security reflects the transformations of the post-Cold War era by combining military with non-military concerns such as environmental damage, social unrest, economic mismanagement, cultural conflict, gender inequity and radical fundamentalism. By way of contrast to realist international relations (IR) theory, developing-world theorists have proposed a different set of variables to explain the unique challenges facing developing states. Finally, the book examines the significance of ecopolitics in security agendas in the Middle East.

Kapor argues that explanations of international relations in Asia in the post-Second World War period have relied too much on the Cold War as a key explanatory factor, and have not given enough emphasis to the useful concepts of 'regional power formation', 'conflict formation' and 'conflict resolution'. The author outlines these concepts and goes on to elaborate on them, and to apply them to three key Asian regions - northeast, southeast, and south Asia - discussing practical strategic issues in an historical perspective and arguing that these concepts, and other concepts which he discusses, are extremely helpful in making sense of the complex pattern of international relations in Asia.